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Interpreting “Use” of a Minor in § 3B1.4: The
Benefits of Adopting a Uniform Hybrid Approach
Mariah Slocum†

ABSTRACT
Sentencing enhancements are applied in a number of circumstances, one of which
is the use of a minor in the commission of a crime. But the law is unsettled as to
whether a defendant’s affirmative act is necessary for implementation of this particular sentencing enhancement under section 3B1.4. An alleged circuit split existed, with some circuits utilizing an affirmative act approach and other circuits
utilizing a reasonable foreseeability approach. Recently, circuits have been applying a hybrid approach that applies the sentencing enhancement when the defendant has affirmatively acted to use the minor in the crime, but in cases involving a
conspiracy the enhancement may be applied if a co-conspirator’s use of the minor
was reasonably foreseeable. This Comment argues for a widespread implementation of that hybrid approach. This Comment demonstrates that use of the hybrid
approach is consistent with the language of section 3B1.4 and the applicable section 1B1.3(a) concerning the factors that determine the sentencing guidelines
range, and it stays true to the purpose of deterring the use of minors in the commission of an offense.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“I just don’t wanna play. I don’t wanna play no more, alright? I
was thinking about going to school, over at Edmonson, ask if
they’ll let me back in at the end of the semester.” Wallace said,
indicating he wants to quit being a drug dealer in Avon Barksdale’s crew.
“What grade?” D’Angelo asked.
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“Ninth.”
“Ninth? . . . [Y]ou how old?”
“16.”
“16 . . . man, you supposed to be a junior by now.”1
The Wire frequently exposes viewers to adults utilizing minors to
perform illegal acts. The most prominent example appears throughout
the first season where minors are “employed” as drug dealers for Barksdale. This position places them in the lowest level of the drug dealing
operation, the Pit. This role also places the minors in vulnerable and
risky positions while the older and more experienced players are often
in behind-the-scenes roles that minimize their risk of getting caught
and prosecuted, and it is nearly impossible for the minors to quit their
role in the drug dealing operation.2 The minors in these instances are
habitually the scapegoats that ultimately face criminal charges if trouble arises, which senior players rely on to avoid detection and prosecution by the police. But if the senior players are caught, how should the
use of minors in their crime affect their sentence?
Consider if Barksdale, the leader of the drug trafficking organization in The Wire, had been convicted and was facing sentencing. It is
clear that many minors were utilized as drug dealers in his organization. As a result, could a two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to
section 3B1.4 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for using a minor to
commit a crime be applied to his sentence?3 The answer depends on the
circuit in which the action took place since different approaches currently exist regarding the circumstances under which the sentencing
enhancement of section 3B1.4 can be applied. The Wire takes place in
Baltimore, Maryland, which is located within the Fourth Circuit. In the
Fourth Circuit, the drug leader, Barksdale, could only have received the
sentencing enhancement for a minor’s participation in his drug organization if Barksdale affirmatively acted to involve the minor in the
crime. Since Barksdale was careful not to involve himself directly with
the dealings of the Pit, an affirmative act may be hard to find. However,
if Barksdale had been located within one of the circuits that follows the

1

The Wire: Game Day (HBO television broadcast Aug. 4, 2002) (Season One, Episode Nine).
The Wire: Cleaning Up (HBO television broadcast Sep. 1, 2002) (Season One, Episode
Twelve) (Wallace, after escaping the Pit and finding shelter at a relative’s home, returns and tries
to get back into the game. However, his betrayal of leaving the drug dealing operation and ratting
to the police gets him killed by the very people he used to call his friends.).
3
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“If
the defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the
offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the offense, increase by 2 levels.”).
2
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other predominant approach to interpreting the sentencing enhancement, or a combined approach, he would receive the enhancement as
long as he could reasonably foresee a co-conspirator’s use of a minor in
the crime. It is much more likely the sentencing enhancement would be
applied under this interpretation since Barksdale undoubtedly could
reasonably foresee those minors being used by his subordinates.
This inconsistency in the application of section 3B1.4 throughout
the circuit courts ultimately leads to varying and inequitable results.
Many different approaches exist as every federal circuit court except
the D.C. Circuit has now issued an opinion regarding the proper interpretation. It is an ideal time for the issue to be considered by the Supreme Court, clarified by the Sentencing Commission, or clarified by
the circuit courts themselves once the cases with the necessary fact patterns are before them. Although scholars have phrased this as a circuit
split, fifteen years have passed since that scholarship was published,
and the issue has yet to be resolved.4 A few circuit courts have changed
their approach to the subject in interesting ways that suggest cohesion
is on the horizon, but unity still has not been achieved. The courts
should adopt a universal interpretation based on the case law of the
circuit courts which have combined the two approaches.
This Comment will begin in Part II by summarizing and analyzing
the initial cases from each circuit that comprehensively grapple with
the proper application of the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4
of the Sentencing Guidelines. It will then go on to summarize the circuits that have changed their approach in subsequent cases and the
reasoning behind those changes. Understanding the initial reasons why
each circuit embraced their specific approach and how they evolved
from those initial analyses is important in understanding how to reconcile the differences in opinion regarding the language of section 3B1.4.
Part III of this Comment will advocate for an interpretation of section
3B1.4 that reconciles the approaches, suggesting that the two approaches apply to two different situations that arise in sentencing, and
a hybrid approach thoroughly accommodates each situation. Recent developments in the case law of the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
demonstrate that this hybrid approach is one that should be favored in
the other circuits as well. Ultimately, this Comment will provide a
unique and updated perspective and solution to the existing literature
by arguing that two different sentencing situations can logically produce two distinct methods of applying the sentencing enhancement of
section 3B1.4 that can coexist in a hybrid approach.
4

See John J. DiChello, Jr., Comment, Crossing Textualist Paths: An Analysis of the Proper
Textualist Interpretation of “Use” Under Section 3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
for “Using” A Minor to Commit A Crime, 107 DICK. L. REV. 359, 363 (2002).
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II. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENT OF SECTION 3B1.4 APPLY?
Federal Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.4, which imposes an enhancement for using a minor to commit a crime, was enacted pursuant
to an enabling provision—“Solicitation of a Minor to Commit a Crime”—
as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.5
Section 3B1.4 states, “[i]f the defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the offense or assist in
avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the offense, increase by 2 levels.”6 The first application note to section 3B1.4 states, “‘Used or attempted to use’ includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting.”7
Circuit courts have disagreed over what is necessary to apply this section 3B1.4 enhancement.
The discrepancies between the circuits and their approaches are
due to the applicability of the language of section 1B1.3(a) in conjunction with section 3B1.4. Section 1B1.3(a) concerns the factors that determine the sentencing guidelines range, and it states:
[u]nless otherwise specified, . . . adjustments in Chapter Three[]
shall be determined . . . in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or
not charged as a conspiracy) . . . all acts and omissions of others
that were . . . reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.8
Specifically, there is a question of whether the language of “the defendant” in section 3B1.4 amounts to a focus on the individual actor and
therefore qualifies as being “otherwise specified” as noted in section
1B1.3(a). If so, this distinguishes the application of section 3B1.4 from
calculations based on a co-conspirator’s behavior and limits the application solely to acts of the defendant. For example, the Third Circuit
has stated “In [the Third Circuit’s] view, § 3B1.4 ‘specifie[s]’ that ‘use of
5

See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 140008,
108 Stat. 2033 (1994); For a detailed summary of how the factors are considered to determine a
sentencing range for each offender, see Kelley Elaine Lockman, Note, Who Brought the Kid?:
United States v. McClain and the Application of Sentencing Enhancements When Use of A Minor
in A Concerted Criminal Activity Was Foreseeable, 36 GA. L. REV. 863, 870–73 (2002).
6
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4.
7
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1; see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless
it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline.”).
8
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(iii).
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a minor’ enhancements be individualized, and thus not based on the
acts of co-conspirators.”9 The countering viewpoint does not see that
language of section 3B1.4 as being within the “otherwise specified.” Instead, that viewpoint reads section 1B1.3(a) alongside section 3B1.4
when determining whether or not to apply the sentencing enhancement, thereby stating that conspiracy situations activate the reasonable foreseeability requirement stated in section 1B1.3(a).10
Every federal circuit court except the D.C. Circuit has addressed
this issue, and a consistent and cohesive agreement, although growing,
has not yet been reached. The majority of the federal circuit courts, like
the Third Circuit, have stated the enhancement applies when the defendant, by some affirmative act, helps to involve the minor in the
crime.11 I will refer to this as the “affirmative act” approach. The minority view has seemingly advocated for a position consistent with the general theory of co-conspirator liability as laid out in Pinkerton v. United
States.12 It has done this by giving reference to section 1B1.3(a) when
defining “use” and by stating that the enhancement additionally applies
when the defendant could reasonably foresee a co-conspirator’s use of a
minor even if the defendant himself or herself did not personally engage
the minor.13 I will refer to this as the “reasonable foreseeability” approach. A growing coalition of the circuits have begun applying both
approaches under differing circumstances.14 This hybrid approach
should be the model for the circuits moving forward.
A.

Original endorsement of the “affirmative act” requirement

In their first published opinions regarding the interpretation of the
word “use” as applied in the section 3B1.4 enhancement, eight of the
circuit courts agreed that the enhancement only applied when the defendant affirmatively acted to engage the minor in the crime, which is

9

See United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2005).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).
11
See United States v. Mata, 624 F.3d 170, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2010) as revised (Nov. 15, 2010);
Pojilenko, 416 F.3d at 247; United States v. Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Cummings, 18 F. App’x 135, 136–37 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 859
(7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Suitor, 253 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849 (6th
Cir. 2000).
12
328 U.S. 640 (1946) (holding that a defendant is liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts
of his co-conspirators done in furtherance of the conspiracy); see Lockman, supra note 5, at 875–
79 (summarizing Pinkerton as expanded upon by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
McClain, 252 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)).
13
See United States v. Lewis, 386 F.3d 475, 479–80 (2d Cir. 2004); McClain, 252 F.3d at 1287–
88; United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2001).
14
See United States v. Rose, 496 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Taber, 497 F.3d
1177 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Voegtlin, 437 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2006).
10
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based on the language of, and commentary to, section 3B1.4. Among the
eight circuits that initially adopted the affirmative act approach, adherence to the position has been quite strong. Disagreement had been limited to minor differences in interpretation concerning what constitutes
an affirmative act. All eight agreed that a defendant must take affirmative steps to involve the minor in the offense for the section 3B1.4 enhancement to be applied. This subsection will summarize the initial
opinions of each circuit to capture the subtle differences in their approaches.
The Sixth Circuit was the first court to adopt the “affirmative act”
requirement in United States v. Butler.15 The court used a textual approach to reach its result and compared Section 3B1.4 of the Sentencing
Guidelines to a similar provision that criminalized the use of juveniles
in drug trafficking.16 This comparison, according to the Sixth Circuit,
demonstrated that “in the criminal context, ‘using’ a minor to carry out
criminal activity entails more than being the equal partner of that minor in committing a crime.”17 The Sixth Circuit articulated what became the “affirmative act” approach in Butler by stating that a defendant must do more than merely act as a partner in crime with a minor to
constitute “use” of a minor under section 3B1.4.18 In Butler, the defendant had participated in a bank robbery with a minor as his partner.19
Although the two had worked together in robbing the bank, the district
court failed to find the defendant had acted affirmatively to involve the
minor in the crime beyond merely acting as a partner.20 Since the district court had not found the defendant had “directed, commanded, intimidated, counseled, trained, procured, recruited, or solicited” the minor’s participation in the crime, which is included in the meaning of
“use” as directed by the commentary of section 3B1.4, the Sixth Circuit
determined the defendant had not acted affirmatively to involve the minor in the crime.21
In the Seventh Circuit, three cases decided within a timespan of
three years developed the Circuit’s interpretation of section 3B1.4. The
15

207 F.3d at 842.
See Butler, 207 F.3d at 847–849 (analyzing 21 U.S.C.A. § 861 in its inquiry into the meaning
of the provision) (“Finally, it is instructive to consider the analogous statutory provision criminalizing the use of juveniles in drug trafficking, which makes it unlawful for an adult to ‘knowingly
and intentionally employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a person under eighteen
years of age’ to violate federal drug laws.”); see also DiChello, supra note 4 (conducting a comprehensive look at the Sixth Circuit’s textualist approach in interpreting the sentencing enhancement
of section 3B1.4 in Butler).
17
Butler, 207 F.3d at 848–49.
18
Id. at 849.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
16
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Seventh Circuit did not explicitly agree with the Sixth Circuit until its
United States v. Vivit22 decision, which built upon precedent from two
prior Seventh Circuit cases.23 Although the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Benjamin24 never explicitly used the language of requiring an
“affirmative act,” Vivit cited Benjamin as interpreting the “use” requirement of section 3B1.4 to have been met when the defendant took an
affirmative action to involve the minor in the crime.25 The Seventh Circuit in Vivit also cited United States v. Brack26 as a prior decision where
it had required an affirmative act by the defendant before applying the
enhancement.27 Despite the court’s reference to, and reliance on, these
aforementioned cases in its review of the meaning of the word “use” in
section 3B1.4, Vivit was the first instance in which the Seventh Circuit
explicitly stated that the sentencing enhancement requires that the defendant perform an affirmative act to involve the minor in the crime.28
The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the “affirmative act” requirement
seems to come from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Butler.29 In Vivit, the
defendant treated three minors for injuries suffered in automobile accidents and directed the minors to falsify their medical attendance records to assist him in committing fraud.30 The Seventh Circuit stated
this act of directing the minors fell within the definition of “use” contemplated by section 3B1.4.31
The Seventh Circuit explored the meaning of section 3B1.4 in more
detail in United States v. Ramsey32 where it held the proper inquiry was
“whether the defendant affirmatively involved a minor in the commission of an offense, regardless of whether the minor is a partner to the
offense or is in a subordinate position.”33 The court further interpreted
“affirmatively involve[ing] a minor” as “direct[ing], command[ing], encourag[ing] or recruit[ing]” the minor to commit the offense.34 The court
in Ramsey also further interpreted and distinguished Benjamin’s holding by explaining that in Benjamin the court relied on the fact that only
22

214 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id.
24
116 F.3d 1204 (7th Cir. 1997).
25
Vivit, 214 F.3d at 920.
26
188 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 1999).
27
Vivit, 214 F.3d at 920.
28
Id. (“[The defendant] ‘used minors in the commission of his crimes’ if his affirmative actions
involved minors in his criminal activities”).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
237 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2001).
33
Id. at 860.
34
Id.
23
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one defendant had been found to have conspired with a minor and
therefore there was no need to examine who “used” the minor.35 The
Seventh Circuit then went on to cite Vivit to explain how the holding in
Benjamin did not eliminate the requirement that the defendant must
affirmatively involve the minor in the offense.36 Ultimately, the Seventh
Circuit held “regardless of whether the minor is a partner or a subordinate, the enhancement will be applied where the defendant affirmatively involved the minor in the commission of a crime.”37 Therefore,
although it agreed with the Sixth Circuit in regards to its implementation of the affirmative act approach, it disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s
determination that mere partnership was not enough.
The Ninth Circuit first confronted the meaning of section 3B1.4 in
United States v. Parker.38 In Parker, the defendant and a minor executed an armed bank robbery as partners.39 The Ninth Circuit held the
section 3B1.4 sentencing enhancement was not warranted “in the absence of evidence that the defendant acted affirmatively to involve the
minor in the robbery, beyond merely acting as his partner.”40 The fact
that the defendant had conspired with the minor and profited from his
involvement in the crime was not seen by the Ninth Circuit as sufficient
to find he had acted affirmatively to involve the minor in the crime.41
The court believed finding otherwise would go against the plain meaning of the statute and the advisory note, which the Ninth Circuit saw
as “clearly impl[ying] that only actions affirmatively taken to involve a
minor in the offense will qualify under § 3B1.4.”42 In Parker, the defendant did not use or attempt to use the minor since he “did not command,
encourage, intimidate, counsel, train, procure, recruit, solicit, or otherwise actively involve [the minor].”43
Similarly, in United States v. Suitor,44 the Tenth Circuit stated “the
two-level § 3B1.4 increase is only applicable if a defendant directs,
trains, or in some other way affirmatively engages the minor participant in the crime of conviction.”45 The defendant admitted to conspiring
with the minors to manufacture and utilize counterfeit checks.46 The
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 859–60.
Id. at 860.
Id.
241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
253 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1209.
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district court relied on that admission as support for its decision to apply the two-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to section 3B1.4.47
The circuit court, however, noted that more than mere involvement in
the conspiracy with the minors was needed in order for the sentencing
enhancement to be applied.48 After clarifying the necessary requirements for applying the enhancement, the Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement by
finding the defendant used the minors in the commission of the crime
by instructing them on which banks to visit, how to present the checks,
and counseling them on how to behave if they were caught.49
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Cummings50 joined the affirmative act approach when it based its decision on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey.51 Despite the fact that the Sixth, Ninth, and
Seventh Circuits are generally seen as being on the same side of this
circuit split, the Fourth Circuit seemingly rejected the affirmative steps
requirement initially raised by the Sixth Circuit in Butler due to its
“narrow approach.”52 Instead, the Fourth Circuit stated the term “encouraging” was what should be focused on in the definition of the term
“use.” Applying that logic, the Fourth Circuit found the defendant had
a special relationship with the minors that he involved in his scheme to
develop and use counterfeit currency and that he encouraged and influenced the minors.53 Despite the initial refusal to use the affirmative act
language, later Fourth Circuit decisions clarify that the Circuit’s reliance on Ramsey includes the requirement of an affirmative act in order
to apply the enhancement.54
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Paine joined the affirmative
act approach in stating that “[b]oth Application Note 1 and cases applying § 3B1.4 make clear the ‘used or attempted to use’ language requires
the defendant to affirmatively involve or incorporate a minor into the
commission of the offense.”55 In Paine, the defendant involved his minor
son in the commission of an armed robbery and as a result received a
sentencing enhancement pursuant to section 3B1.4.56 Since the defendant admitted to asking his son to accompany him on the robbery, the
47

Id.
Id. at 1210 (“The evidence, therefore, must demonstrate more than the simple fact that [the
defendant] was involved in a conspiracy with the minors.”).
49
Id.
50
18 F. App’x 135 (4th Cir. 2001).
51
Id. at 136–37.
52
Id.; see also id. at 136 n.3.
53
Id. at 137.
54
See, e.g. United States v. Feaster, 43 F. App’x 628, 632 (4th Cir. 2002).
55
407 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2005).
56
Id. at 960.
48
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Eighth Circuit was able to find an affirmative act and upheld the sentencing enhancement.57
In United States v. Pojilenko, the Third Circuit joined the affirmative act approach in requiring that “some affirmative act is necessary
beyond mere partnership in order to implicate § 3B1.4.”58 In that case,
the defendant served as a muscle man for a criminal enterprise and was
convicted for his participation in a robbery that also involved a minor.59
Due to this minor’s involvement, the district court applied a section
3B1.4 two-level enhancement to the defendant’s sentence for the use of
a minor.60 The Third Circuit agreed with the defendant that the use of
the minor by other members of the conspiracy could not be accredited
to the defendant, thereby rejecting the possibility of utilizing the “reasonable foreseeability” approach.61 Instead, it expanded slightly on
what would constitute evidence of an affirmative act by stating that
there was no evidence of the defendant engaging in an affirmative act
“to direct, command, encourage, intimidate, counsel, train, procure, recruit or solicit” the minor.62 Because the defendant had only heard reference to the minor during a phone conversation, the Third Circuit determined that he had not engaged in an affirmative act to recruit or
direct the minor.63
The Fifth Circuit analyzed in United States v. Mata64 whether applying section 3B1.4 was warranted when the defendant used the minor
to assist in avoiding detection of the offense.65 The defendant had used
her minor child and the minor children of a friend by having them in
the car with her while she attempted to transport an undocumented
immigrant over state lines in order to reduce suspicion regarding her
planned illegal activity.66 Although this was not the first time the Fifth
Circuit had addressed the issue of how to interpret what constitutes

57

Id. at 965–66.
416 F.3d 243, 247 (3d Cir. 2005) (The Third Circuit further commented that “[t]o hold that
any defendant who merely participated with a minor in a crime is subject to a two-level enhancement and would create, in effect, an across-the-board enhancement that would conflict with the
notion that this enhancement is reserved for defendants who play a particular role in the offense.”).
59
Id. at 245.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 246.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 247.
64
624 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2010).
65
Id. at 175.
66
Id. at 172, 175.
58
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“use” under the enhancement in section 3B1.4,67 Mata was its first published opinion regarding the issue.68 Each unpublished Fifth Circuit decision concerning section 3B1.4 had held that in order to be found to
have involved the minor in the offense, the defendant had to have taken
some affirmative action and the “mere presence of the minor at the
scene of a crime” was not enough.69 An affirmative act, the Fifth Circuit
ruled in Mata, includes intentionally using a minor to avoid detection
by purposely bringing them along for the commission of the offense.70
It is important to note the facts of the above cases, with the exception of Pojilenko, did not involve a conspiracy situation that would give
rise to the possibility of utilizing the reasonable foreseeability approach.
Therefore, many of the circuits were not considering use of the “reasonable foreseeability” approach simply because they had not yet had the
opportunity to consider application of section 3B1.4 in the context of a
conspiracy.
B.

Original endorsement of the “reasonable foreseeability” approach

The “reasonable foreseeability” approach was initially followed by
three of the circuit courts. These circuits advanced the Pinkerton71 logic
by holding the enhancement is applicable if the defendant could reasonably foresee a co-conspirator’s use of a minor in the crime. This approach defines the word “use” in section 3B1.4 by referencing another
section within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, section 1B1.3(a),
which provides, “[u]nless otherwise specified, . . . adjustments in Chapter Three [ ] shall be determined on the basis of . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”72 This subsection will summarize the first
opinions of each of these three circuits that initially adopted the reasonable foreseeability approach when the factual circumstances were that
the defendant was involved in a conspiracy to display how the circuits
differed in their analyses. These opinions both defined these circuits’
position on when to apply the two-level sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 and allowed for the sentencing enhancement to be applied

67

See, e.g., United States v. Zertuche, 228 F. App’x 462, 463 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Cuellar, 151 F. App’x 352 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); United States v. Farias, 112 F. App’x 374,
374 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gutierrez, 251 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Ibarra-Sandoval, 216 F.3d 1079 (Table) (5th Cir. 2000).
68
Mata, 624 F.3d at 177.
69
Id. at 175–76.
70
Id. at 176–77.
71
328 U.S. 640 (1946) (establishing vicarious liability in conspiracy cases).
72
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a).
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when it was reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would involve
the minor in the crime.
The First Circuit initially confronted the application of the sentencing enhancement in an unpublished decision, United States v. MederaCastro.73 However, its first published decision that interpreted section
3B1.4 was United States v. Patrick.74 In Patrick, the defendant had attempted to rely on evidence that the minors involved in the drug transactions worked for a co-conspirator and that no one had testified that
he himself employed minors.75 However, since the defendant was convicted of conspiracy, the First Circuit held that the defendant’s sentence
“could be enhanced based on his co-conspirators’ reasonably foreseeable
use of juveniles to further the [organization]’s activities” and cited section 1B1.3(a)’s reasonable foreseeability language in support of that
finding.76
Initially, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly embraced the reasonable
foreseeability approach when it faced a conspiracy case in United States
v. McClain77 by stating in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, “[a]ny
defendants who could have reasonably foreseen the use of a minor . . .
are culpable under the plain language of sections 3B1.4 and
1B1.3(a)(1)(B).”78 In McClain, the Eleventh Circuit found the Sixth Circuit’s position in Butler to be factually inapposite.79 It held section 3B1.4
was applicable to “participants in a jointly undertaken criminal enterprise in which use of a minor was reasonably foreseeable,” and that coconspirator’s recruitment of a minor to be involved in the defendant’s
counterfeit check scheme was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
because he was the leader and because both he and his co-conspirator
had been recruiting young people.80 No affirmative act existed in
McClain, but the existence of a conspiracy allowed the court to still hold
the defendant accountable for the minor’s use in the crime by utilizing
the reasonable foreseeability approach.
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187 F.3d 624 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[C]ontrary to appellant’s assertion in his brief, the two-level
increase did not require a finding that a minor was used in the sales made by appellant himself.
Instead, the question is whether the use of minors was a ‘reasonably foreseeable act[ ] . . . of others
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Lastly, the Second Circuit embraced the “reasonable foreseeability”
language when interpreting section 3B1.4.81 The defendant in United
States v. Lewis82 participated in a supervisory role in a drug distribution
scheme in which a minor participated by selling drugs.83 The Second
Circuit answered the issue of
whether § 3B1.4 can be applied to increase the offense level of
the leader of a conspiracy who was not directly involved with
recruiting a minor, and did not have actual knowledge that such
individual was a minor, but who nonetheless had general authority over the activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.84
Following the reasonable foreseeability approach, the Second Circuit
agreed that the enhancement was permitted.85 The court found the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that a minor could be used in
the conspiracy because the defendant was an organizer and leader of
the drug distribution ring and the environment was one in which adults
and minors lived together in close proximity.86 Additionally, like the
First and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit held the intersection of
section 3B1.4 and section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) required this result.87
The Second Circuit in Lewis also acknowledged the other circuit
court cases that require a defendant to have taken affirmative steps to
involve the minor in the crime in order for the application of the enhancement.88 The court stated those cases were inapplicable to the case
at hand because they dealt with the question of what constitutes “use”
as applied for the purposes of section 3B1.4 rather than the intersection
of section 3B1.4 and section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which applies in situations
of a conspiracy.89 Therefore, the Second Circuit in Lewis did not see itself as interpreting the meaning of the word “use,” but it saw the question of whether the sentencing enhancement should be imposed on coconspirators who could have reasonably foreseen the involvement of the
minor as a different issue entirely.90 Additionally, the Second Circuit
did not share the concern of other circuits that such a conclusion would
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United States v. Lewis, 386 F.3d 475, 479–80 (2d Cir. 2004).
386 F.3d 475 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 478–79.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 479–80.
Id.
Id. at 479 (citing McClain, 252 F.3d at 1287–88 and Patrick, 248 F.3d at 27–28).
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id.
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lead to co-conspirators being strictly liable whenever a minor is involved in the conspiracy, regardless of the circumstances.91 This is because the “reasonable foreseeability” requirement compels the court to
assess the factual circumstances of every case and co-conspirators that
could not have reasonably foreseen the use of the minor in the conspiracy would not face the implementation of the enhancement.92
C.

Changes that have occurred in the circuits since their initial
stance on the issue

Part 1 describes changes that have occurred in the reasoning of
some of the affirmative act circuits regarding section 3B1.4 since their
initial rulings. Overall, these eight circuits have continued to adhere to
the affirmative act requirement, although hostility to the reasonable
foreseeability approach has diminished in all but two circuits. Part 2
describes any changes that have occurred in the reasoning of the reasonable foreseeability circuits regarding section 3B1.4 and the move towards adopting the “affirmative act” language in a hybrid approach.
1.

Changes that have occurred in the circuits that initially supported the affirmative action requirement of section 3B1.4

For the most part, the circuits that have taken the “affirmative act”
position continue to apply this approach with little to no variation. The
Sixth,93 Tenth,94 Fourth,95 Third,96 Seventh,97 and Fifth Circuits98 all
continue to consistently interpret section 3B1.4 as requiring an affirmative action in their successive cases without any changes to this approach.

91

Id.
Id.
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See, e.g., United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Wheeler, 67 F. App’x 296, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2003).
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See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 509 F. App’x 765, 779 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Pena-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1121 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Seanez, 221 F. App’x 773,
778 (10th Cir. 2007).
95
See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Feaster, 43 F. App’x 628 (4th Cir. 2002).
96
See, e.g., United States v. Pooler, 425 F. App’x 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Xhengiz Zaku, 176 F. App’x 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2006).
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See United States v. Bowlin, 534 F.3d 654, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Choiniere, 517 F.3d 967, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hall, 217 F. App’x 555 (7th Cir.
2007); United States v. Brazinskas, 458 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Perez-Martinez,
75 F. App’x 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hodges, 315 F.3d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Anderson, 259 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d
677, 682 (7th Cir. 2001).
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732 F.3d 361, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2013).
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In fact, the view among some of the circuits that a co-conspirator’s
reasonably foreseeable use of a minor is sufficient to apply the section
3B1.4 enhancement was explicitly rejected by the Third Circuit in
Pojilenko.99 In expressing its disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit,
the court stated the language of section 3B1.4 enhancement is defendant-specific and “the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines compels the
conclusion that the use of a minor enhancement must be based on an
individualized determination of each defendant’s culpability.”100 The
Third Circuit looked to the language in the introductory commentary of
Part B of Chapter Three of the Sentencing Guidelines, which states,
“[t]his Part provides adjustments to the offense level based upon the
role the defendant played in committing the offense.”101 In its analysis,
the Third Circuit placed emphasis on the words “the defendant” in the
introductory language and the language in section 3B1.4.102 In addition,
the Third Circuit pointed to a Fourth Circuit decision, United States v.
Moore,103 to reach the same conclusion that each sentencing adjustment
in Part B cannot be based on the actions of co-conspirators.104 As a result, the Third Circuit concluded “[t]he role in the offense provisions of
Part B are clearly intended to distinguish between participants in an
offense based on whether their particular roles make them more or less
culpable than others who commit the same offense.”105 In quoting
Moore, the Third Circuit also stated the very purpose of the provisions
in Part B would be undermined if the defendant was found to be able to
receive an enhancement even if the defendant himself or herself did not
personally satisfy the requirements of that sentencing enhancement
provision and only a co-conspirator satisfied them.106
The Seventh Circuit was also directly confronted with the alleged
circuit split in United States v. Acosta.107 The Seventh Circuit in Acosta
chose to adhere to its initial position requiring an affirmative act, and
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United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We have yet to rule on whether
a co-conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable use of a minor can be attributed to other members of a
conspiracy for purposes of applying an enhancement under § 3B1.4. We now hold that it cannot.”).
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Pojilenko, 416 F.3d at 248.
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it expressly rejected the reasonable foreseeability approach.108 In doing
so, the Seventh Circuit became the second circuit after the Third Circuit
to expressly reject the reasonable foreseeability approach.109 The Seventh Circuit additionally embraced the Third Circuit’s reasoning for its
rejection of the extension of section 3B1.4’s reach through application
of the reasonable foreseeability approach stating, “[the reasonable foreseeability approach] makes no sense in the context of the individualized
enhancements set out in section 3B of the Guidelines, which seek to
punish the particular behavior of individual members of a conspiracy.”110 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted an interesting point
that the government had not noted “any case in which courts applied Pinkerton principles to the other enhancements listed in Part B of
Chapter 3 of the Guidelines.”111
However, despite the strong stance taken by the Third and Seventh
Circuits, the Eighth Circuit has since applied the section 3B1.4 sentencing enhancement to conspiracy cases in which it found that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a co-conspirator would utilize
a minor in a crime.112 These cases do not mean, however, that the
Eighth Circuit has abandoned the “affirmative act” requirement. Rather, many subsequent Eighth Circuit cases continued to require that
the defendant affirmatively act to involve the minor in the crime when
the situation did not involve a conspiracy and a co-conspirator’s involvement of a minor in the crime.113 Additionally, the court in both United
States v. Spotted Elk114 and United States v. Voegtlin115 discussed and
upheld the affirmative act requirement while also applying the sentencing enhancement under the reasonable foreseeability approach.116 In
Spotted Elk, the Eighth Circuit upheld a finding by the district court
that “it was reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant] that other co-conspirators were using a certain child to sell drugs, to hold money, and to
108

Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1002–03 (“Among our fellow circuits taking the ‘affirmative act’ position, only the
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do other acts on behalf of the conspiracy,” and it also stated the defendant had sold cocaine directly to the minor.117 In Voegtlin, the Eighth
Circuit applied the same reasonable foreseeability approach as laid out
by the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits by relying on the language
of section 1B1.3.118 It was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that
his co-conspirator would involve the minor since the defendant knew
the minor had driven the co-conspirator on drug-related operations,
knew that both the co-conspirator and the minor had bought pills for
the defendant, and had directed the minor to incriminate someone else
if he was arrested.119
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Goodbear120 considered “whether, for purposes of applying a § 3B1.4 enhancement, the
use of a minor can be attributed to another for a misprision of felony
offense” because the court believed that whether or not the enhancement was appropriate depended on the language of the misprision of
felony statute.121 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the language and commentary of the misprision of felony statute, section 2X4.1, which stated
“any applicable specific offense characteristics” should be applied that
were “known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant.”122 The defendant’s husband had instructed both the defendant and
her minor son to lie about the assault her husband committed against
their young daughter.123 The defendant in Goodbear argued the district
court misapplied the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 as there
was nothing to suggest she took an affirmative act to involve the minor
son in the offense.124 Ignoring the “affirmative act” requirement that
was previously imposed by the Ninth Circuit, the court found there was
no abuse of discretion in adding the section 3B1.4 enhancement because
it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a co-conspirator
would use a minor.125
Therefore, the language of “reasonable foreseeability” was recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Goodbear, although not because of section
1B1.3(a) as the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits have endorsed, but
rather because of the language of the offense statute. Yet, other Ninth
117
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Circuit decisions issued after Parker and after Goodbear continued to
apply the affirmative act approach in interpreting the sentencing guidelines.126 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit only seemed to apply the “reasonably foreseeable” language since it was utilized in section 2X4.1 of
the felony misprision statute, so it does not necessarily see the issue in
the same way as the “reasonable foreseeability” circuits have approached it through the Sentencing Guidelines. It is important to note,
however, that the decision in Goodbear suggests the Ninth Circuit
would at the very least reject the Third Circuit’s view that section 3B1.4
is defendant-specific and that the enhancement must only be based on
the individualized determination of the defendant’s culpability. Additionally, the reasoning utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Goodbear followed a similar pattern to that of the reasonable foreseeability circuits
by looking to another applicable statute and the notes of that statute,
which directed the court to consider reasonably foreseeable acts. This is
parallel to what the circuits that apply the reasonable foreseeability approach do when they look to the applicable section 1B1.3(a) and follow
its mandates regarding conspiracy situations.
2.

Changes that have occurred in the circuits that initially supported the reasonable foreseeability requirement of section
3B1.4

The First Circuit acknowledged the circuit split as recently as September 5, 2017 in United States v. Corbett,127 where the defendant who
had been involved in a conspiracy was found to have used the minor by
encouraging her drug sales activity, but there was no mention in the
case of the language of requiring an affirmative act.128 However, with
that acknowledgment, the court concluded that it did not need to address the supposed split since “the question of the enhancement’s applicability on these facts concerns only [the defendant]’s actions” rather
than on a co-conspirator’s actions.129 In other words, in Corbett the court
was not considering whether or not to continue to utilize the reasonable
126

See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 612 F. App’x 433, 436 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v.
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foreseeability approach regarding a co-conspirator’s use of a minor or to
abandon that accepted method in favor of endorsing solely the affirmative act approach regardless of the circumstances. The other previous,
but less-recent, First Circuit decision regarding the same issue continued to embrace and apply the reasonable foreseeability requirement in
a conspiracy case.130 Although it has focused on the defendant’s actions
and utilized reasoning similar to the language used by courts in requiring an affirmative act, the First Circuit is now alone in its refusal to
adopt the language of the “affirmative act” requirement and in maintaining its sole support for the application of section 3B1.4 if it was reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that a co-conspirator would use a
minor.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to this issue changed to utilize
both methods in a hybrid approach, which highlights the confusion that
needs to be addressed and resolved. For a while, the Eleventh Circuit
continued to implement the reasonable foreseeability test in determining whether section 3B1.4 should apply.131 However, the Eleventh Circuit changed its position in United States v. Taber.132 There, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the two-level adjustment pursuant to section 3B1.4
because the defendant had committed three affirmative acts to involve
and encourage the minor in the offense: driving them to the scene of the
crime, assisting the minor in entering the scene of the crime, and acting
as a lookout for the minor.133 The Eleventh Circuit in Taber acknowledged that McClain was the previous authority on the application of
section 3B1.4 in that circuit, but stated that “[b]ecause we did not have
the opportunity to discuss the definition and scope of the terms “use” or
“attempted to use” as they are employed in § 3B1.4, it remains an open
question in this circuit.”134 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit viewed its
McClain holding—that the enhancement was applicable to participants
in a jointly undertaken criminal enterprise in which use of a minor was
reasonably foreseeable—as answering a different question than what
the correct interpretation of the word “use” within the enhancement is
when no conspiracy exists.
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit in Taber joined the hybrid approach in holding that in order to apply the enhancement in a non-conspiracy case, an affirmative step to involve the minor in the commission
130
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of the criminal activity is required.135 Interestingly, the court noted the
same focus as the Third Circuit on the particular defendant-specific language in the introductory commentary to part B of chapter three in the
guidelines. Despite acknowledging the division among the circuits over
what type of affirmative act is required, the Eleventh Circuit did not
weigh in on what it would consider to be sufficient.136 Instead, the court
found the defendant’s three acts did encourage and help the minor to
commit the crime, which was sufficient to find the defendant affirmatively involved the minor.137 Eleventh Circuit decisions after Taber continued to apply the affirmative act requirement.138 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not abandon the reasonable foreseeability approach
altogether. Rather, subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases applied precedent taking both approaches, distinguishing cases in which the defendant was involved in a joint criminal enterprise from those in which the
defendant acted only with the minor.139
The Second Circuit faced the issue of whether the application of the
sentencing enhancement pursuant to section 3B1.4 was warranted
again in United States v. Rose.140 In Rose, the defendant had orchestrated a kidnapping scheme that involved the assistance of a minor.141
In evaluating the appropriateness of the application of the sentencing
enhancement, the court initially based its analysis on the reasonable
foreseeability standard as laid out in Lewis.142 The defendant in Lewis,
like the defendant in Rose, had also conceived of and directed the
crime.143 Since another person involved in the crime had encouraged the
minor’s involvement by handing him a gun to utilize in the crime, the
Second Circuit in Rose determined that the defendant knew or could
have reasonably foreseen the co-conspirator’s use of the minor to commit the robbery.144 Despite concluding that the evidence supported a
finding that the defendant had used the minor to conduct his crime un-
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der that standard, the court also addressed and dismissed the defendant’s argument that the sentencing enhancement was only merited
where a minor was being exploited, and in doing so it turned to the
holdings in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in Butler and Parker that require an affirmative act as guidance.145 After applying the standards of
Butler and Parker, the court found the sentencing enhancement under
section 3B1.4 was permissible because the defendant had “solicited, recruited, procured, trained, encouraged, and commanded [the minor],”
which fits within the accepted definition of an affirmative act in the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits.146 Therefore, in the conspiracy context of
Rose, the Second Circuit found the requirements for implementing the
sentencing enhancement were met under both the reasonably foreseeable approach and the affirmative act approach.
D. The current positions of the circuit courts regarding when to apply the sentencing enhancement under section 3B1.4
As of December 2017, all but one of the circuits that have faced the
question of how to interpret the language of section 3B1.4 require that
the defendant engaged in an affirmative act to involve the minor in the
crime in order for the sentencing enhancement to be applied. The First
Circuit is the only circuit who has yet to utilize the language of the affirmative act approach despite facing a case in which it applied the sentencing enhancement because of the defendant’s own actions where he
“encouraged the minor’s drug activity.”147 Three circuits utilize a hybrid
method and apply each approach when it is factually appropriate to do
so: the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Although the Second and
Eleventh Circuits did join the other circuits in the “affirmative act”
camp, neither of the circuits abandoned the reasonable foreseeability
approach entirely. These circuits still utilize it when they are faced with
a conspiracy case because they see the two approaches as simply being
two different methods that are suitable to use under different circumstances. The Eighth Circuit began by requiring the defendant to affirmatively act to involve the minor in the crime, but subsequently also began applying the sentencing enhancement to cases in which it was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the co-conspirator would
involve the minor in the crime.
The Third and Seventh Circuits remain the only two circuits to explicitly reject the applicability of the “reasonable foreseeability” approach in conspiracy cases despite the language of 1B1.3(a) because
145
146
147
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they state the defendant-specific language of section 3B1.4 qualifies as
being “otherwise specified.” It is unclear where the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits would side in this debate since they have yet to face
a conspiracy situation in which the defendant could not be said to have
affirmatively acted to involve the minor in the crime but could have
reasonably foreseen the use of the minor by a co-conspirator. Although
it has used “reasonable foreseeability” language, the Ninth Circuit did
not do so in the same way as the other circuits because it did not base
its analysis on the interrelation between sections 3B1.4 and 1B1.3(a).
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s willingness to analyze the intersection
of section 3B1.4 with another section in a similar manner suggests it
does not adhere to the defendant-specific viewpoint and may be open to
utilizing the “reasonable foreseeability” language if it faced a conspiracy
case.
III. CIRCUIT COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A HYBRID APPROACH TO CREATE
UNIFORMITY

Although it may seem as if the alleged circuit split is almost satisfactorily resolved in light of the trend toward a recognition of the affirmative act requirement in at least some circumstances and the increasing use of the hybrid approach in several circuits, an important
conflict remains. This is especially true when one considers that the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have moved away from utilizing solely the
affirmative action requirement once they were faced with a conspiracy
case in which the co-conspirator utilized the minor in the crime. With
some of the circuits outright rejecting the reasonable foreseeability approach, some using the affirmative action requirement and the reasonable foreseeability of a co-conspirator requirement in a hybrid approach, and some staying silent regarding the differences in opinion, a
consistent method of deciphering section 3B1.4’s enhancement requirement is still needed to encourage consistency among the circuits.
While previous scholarship framed the court decisions as a circuit
split and took different positions in favor of one reading of the language
or another, it is not clear that the differences among the circuits regarding the interpretation of section 3B1.4 should even be described as a
circuit split anymore.148 Rather, the disagreement in the interpretation
of the language of section 3B1.4 and when to apply the sentencing enhancement of that section is simply because there are two different existing applications that apply to two different circumstances. Indeed,
the question of whether section 3B1.4 should apply to the defendant
based on his acts alone in a case where no conspiracy is charged differs
148
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from the question of whether section 3B1.4 should apply to the defendant based on the activity of his co-conspirator in situations of a conspiracy.
The distinction between the section 3B1.4 interpretations is most
evident in collaborative crimes in which one criminal might not have
directly solicited a minor’s involvement, but he or she may have known
of or should have reasonably foreseen the minor’s involvement. In that
circumstance, should courts strictly adhere to the affirmative act requirement based on the defendant’s conduct alone, or does the language
of 1B1.3(a) combined with section 3B1.4 suggest that courts can also
use the reasonable foreseeability approach regarding a co-conspirator’s
use of a minor? If this issue continues to be phrased as a circuit split,
this is where the divide truly exists. Yet most of the courts have simply
not been faced with a conspiracy charge that poses the question of
whether or not to apply the reasonable foreseeability approach regarding a co-conspirator’s use of a minor. Had the circuit courts seen such
conspiracy cases and subsequently rejected the reasonable foreseeability approach, then a more definitive circuit split would exist. Instead,
the opposite has occurred when the circuits have been faced with such
a case. Therefore, it is not genuinely a split, but rather one interpretation of the enhancement is further defined by the co-conspirator language of section 1B1.3(a).
The circuit courts are actually closer to a cohesive agreement regarding section 3B1.4 than possibly they themselves, or than previous
scholarship on the issue, recognize. By looking to the advancements in
the case law regarding the issue, two arguments arise that represent
different possible approaches that circuit courts could adapt to finally
achieve a uniform application of section 3B1.4. Either the approaches
are at odds with one another and cannot co-exist under the language of
the section, or the changes within the circuits as the case law progressed has demonstrated that rather than there being a circuit split,
two plausible and reconcilable methods have emerged regarding application of the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4, and they can
successfully be utilized under the appropriate factual circumstances.
First, this Comment will argue that both methods regarding application of the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 can successfully
be utilized under the appropriate factual circumstances, as demonstrated by the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in their adaptation of a hybrid approach to the sentencing enhancement. It will then
demonstrate that the hybrid approach is consistent with the statutory
interpretation of section 3B1.4. Finally, this Comment will address why
the rejection of the reasonable foreseeability approach entirely is unpersuasive in comparison with the hybrid approach and will address
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concerns that could arise with full implementation of the hybrid approach.
A.

The hybrid approach is favorable and should be adopted by the
other circuits as they face applicable conspiracy cases
1.

The changes of the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits demonstrate that the two methods of interpreting section 3B1.4 can successfully and logically co-exist

Rather than looking at this issue as a circuit split, courts should
view these interpretations as two different issues altogether that can
coexist in a hybrid approach. Two of the circuits that followed the reasonable foreseeability approach have additionally adopted the viewpoint that the sentencing enhancement applies if the defendant affirmatively acted to involve the minor in the crime when there is no
conspiracy charge. One circuit went in the opposite direction and applied the reasonably foreseeable approach in conspiracy cases in addition to the affirmative act approach when it is based only on the defendant’s actions. Rather than replacing one approach with another, these
circuits all saw the two approaches as being compatible, and they have
continued to implement this hybrid approach for many years since.
For example, the Eighth Circuit decided Paine in 2005, and it began the opinion by stating that “[b]oth Application Note 1 and cases
applying § 3B1.4 make clear the ‘used or attempted to use’ language requires the defendant to affirmatively involve or incorporate a minor into
the commission of the offense.”149 However, in later Eighth Circuit cases
regarding conspiracy convictions, the court faced the different question
of whether the enhancement could be applied to the defendant when a
co-conspirator, rather than the defendant himself, used the minor in
the offense. Just one year after Paine in 2006, the Eighth Circuit decided Voegtlin, and in 2008 it decided Spotted Elk. In both cases the
court answered that question in the affirmative. In doing so, the Eighth
Circuit began utilizing a hybrid approach, which it has effectively maintained for the last eleven years. The Eighth Circuit saw these two cases
as being consistent with the precedent of Paine despite the change.150
In 2004, the Second Circuit in Lewis saw the cases from the affirmative act approach as addressing the meaning of “use” as applied in section 3B1.4, but that the facts of Lewis were about the intersection of
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United States v. Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Voegtlin, 437 F.3d 741, 747 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Paine in its reasoning).
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section 1B1.3(a) and section 3B1.4.151 The Second Circuit effectively introduced the idea of viewing the two approaches as separate considerations: one when the defendant is not involved in a conspiracy and one
when the defendant has been convicted of a conspiracy. Three years
later, in 2007, the Second Circuit decided Rose and used reasoning from
both the affirmative act approach and the reasonable foreseeability approach to apply the sentencing enhancement in case involving a conspiracy. The two methods have coexisted for the last ten years as a hybrid approach to applying the section in the Second Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit decided McClain in 2001 with a detailed analysis of why sections 1B1.3(a) and 3B1.4 result in an interpretation that
“section 3B1.4 [was] applicable to participants in a jointly undertaken
criminal enterprise in which use of a minor was reasonably foreseeable.”152 Six years later, in 2007, the Eleventh Circuit decided Taber and
began applying the affirmative act approach to determine whether the
defendant used the minor in the commission of the crime where no conspiracy was charged.153 For the last ten years, the Eleventh Circuit has
maintained the hybrid approach, and it views the two approaches as
two different considerations.
Additionally, in Goodbear, the Ninth Circuit recognized the “affirmative act” requirement but chose to apply the reasonable foreseeability approach based on the circumstances at hand. The court found
there was no abuse of discretion in adding the section 3B1.4 enhancement because it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a coconspirator would use a minor.154 This is because a situation arose
where the court could not find an affirmative action on behalf of the
defendant, but it could apply the enhancement based on the fact that it
was reasonably foreseeable that her husband would involve the minor
in the offense. The changes in the Ninth Circuit’s case law have shown
that the circuit is likely open to interpreting future conspiracy cases
with the reasonable foreseeability approach. Rather than basing this on
the relationship between sections 3B1.4 and 1B1.3(a), the Ninth Circuit
relied on the language of the offense.155
Yet it is reasonable to suggest that the Ninth Circuit would continue to reject the Third Circuit’s view that section 3B1.4 is defendantspecific and that the enhancement must only be based on the individualized determination of the defendant’s culpability. The Ninth Circuit
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United States v. Lewis, 386 F.3d 475, 480 (2d Cir. 2004).
United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Taber, 497 F.3d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Goodbear, 676 F.3d 904, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 911.
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will likely endorse the hybrid approach’s understanding of implementing section 1B1.3(a) if faced with such a case since it has already deviated from solely utilizing the affirmative act requirement and used the
“reasonable foreseeability” language. Although it would be preferable
to have the Ninth Circuit explicitly adopt the reasoning behind the hybrid approach of looking to both sections 1B1.3(a) and 3B1.4 when determining the applicability of the sentencing enhancement in a conspiracy case for consistency purposes, the Ninth Circuit did determine that
an affirmative act was not necessary. This determination is consistent
with the reasoning of the circuits utilizing the hybrid approach and disputes the stance taken by the Third and Seventh Circuits.
Each circuit that uses the hybrid approach by applying the affirmative act approach for individual acts and the reasonable foreseeability
approach for conspiracies has done so for a significant period of time—
ten or more years—without any noticeable problems. These circuits
have demonstrated that not only is the hybrid approach compatible
with the statutory interpretation of the text, but that it also makes
sense when considering the special treatment of conspiracy cases as reflected in Pinkerton. The variety of cases within the circuits with different factual circumstances demonstrate the reasons why courts would
want to logically use each test.
2.

The hybrid approach is consistent with the statutory interpretation of section 3B1.4

Each approach appears to be utilizing a canon of construction
called in pari materia, which is defined as “on the same subject; relating
to the same matter.”156 This canon of construction states that “statutes
that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on
the same subject.”157 The circuits that employ the hybrid approach apply this canon of construction more faithfully.
If we accept the common interpretation that the defendant’s use of
a minor requires an affirmative act in order for the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 to apply, the question remains whether an affirmative act is also necessary in a conspiracy situation. The text of section
3B1.4 and its notes do not provide a clear answer to this question. Once
we turn to the introductory commentary, as circuits utilizing the hybrid
approach have done, we see that the defendant’s role in the offense is to
be determined on the basis of all conduct within the scope of section
1B1.3. From there, it makes sense under in pari materia to then turn
156
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In pari materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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to the language of section 1B1.3, which states that in conspiracy situations, all acts of others in the conspiracy that were reasonably foreseeable are attributed to the defendant unless otherwise specified.
In fact, the viability of this hybrid approach is probably most
clearly found in the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, which focused
heavily on the introductory commentary to chapter three, part B, which
states:
This Part provides adjustments to the offense level based upon
the role the defendant played in committing the offense. The determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is to be made on
the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct), i.e., all conduct included under § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4), and
not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of
conviction.158
If anything, this language supports the fact that the circuits implementing the hybrid approach are still focusing on the defendant’s role in the
offense by carrying out the correct implementation of the enhancement
under the special circumstances of a conspiracy, despite Acosta’s attempt to claim otherwise. The “unless otherwise specified” language
does not stop 1B1.3(a)(B) from implementing a reasonably foreseeable
test in situations of a conspiracy to determine whether the defendant
should receive the sentencing enhancement because there is nothing in
section 3B1.4 that otherwise specifies a direction to be taken when the
defendant has been convicted of a conspiracy. Therefore, the reasonable
foreseeability approach utilized in conspiracy situations under many
other circumstances can and should be implemented in this way when
determining the application of the sentencing enhancement of 3B1.4.
As McClain pointed out, Butler’s concern that the enhancement
will be applied to all defendants “regardless of the roles they played in
involving a minor in the crime”159 is unwarranted because the intersection of sections 3B1.4 and 1B1.3(a) still focuses on the defendant’s specific role in the conspiracy.160 If the defendant could not have reasonably
foreseen the use of the minor, he will not receive the sentencing enhancement. Additionally, “the role the defendant played in committing
the offense” certainly includes his or her role and responsibility in the
conspiracy as directed by section 1B1.3(a) and when considering the
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U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. B, introductory cmt.
United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 848 (6th Cir. 2000).
United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2001).
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conspiracy logic behind the Pinkerton doctrine. The focus on only punishing the defendant’s culpability when applying the enhancement of
section 3B1.4 is maintained with the utilization of the hybrid approach.
When the defendant has not been convicted of a conspiracy, the requirement that the defendant take an affirmative act to involve the minor in the crime is sensible. However, a conspiracy is an entirely different situation and is treated as such in other areas of the law through
the rule of vicarious liability.161 It is apparent under section 1B1.3 that
a defendant convicted of a conspiracy is responsible under the Sentencing Guidelines for all reasonably foreseeable acts of a co-conspirator
taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, a hybrid approach
that applies the affirmative act requirement when it is the defendant
alone and the reasonable foreseeability requirement when the defendant has been convicted of a conspiracy is the logical solution that should
be embraced by the circuits going forward.
B.

The Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit’s explicit rejection of extending the application of the sentencing enhancement is outdated and unpersuasive

An obvious counterargument exists in the precedent set by the
Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit since both have explicitly rejected
the reasonable foreseeability approach even in the context of conspiracy
cases. These circuits have faced situations where the enhancement
could apply due to a co-conspirator’s use of a minor and rejected it. Although the Second, Eighth, Eleventh, and Ninth (to a certain extent)
Circuits have demonstrated the possibility of embracing the defendantspecific language in the same opinion that employs the reasonable foreseeability approach, the Third Circuit in Pojilenko and the Seventh Circuit in Acosta dismiss this possibility by acknowledging that
the circuits that use the “reasonably foreseeable” test have ignored the words, “[u]nless otherwise specified,” which precede
§ 1B1.3(a)’s command to impute to defendants all reasonably
foreseeable acts by co-conspirators. Section 3B1.4 does otherwise specify, the court stated; by its terms, it applies only if “the
defendant used or attempted to use” a minor in the commission
of the offense.162
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For a detailed description of vicarious liability, see Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability
and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2008).
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United States v. Acosta, 474 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243, 248 (7th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis in original).
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The use of the words “unless otherwise specified” in section 1B1.3(a)
plays a large role in this analysis and rejection of the dual approach. In
fact, as pointed out earlier, the viability of the reasonable foreseeability
approach to section 3B1.4 seems to depend on the meaning of “unless
otherwise specified” in section 1B1.3(a). If the defendant-specific language as described in the Third Circuit qualifies as being otherwise
specified for the purposes of section 1B1.3(a), as Acosta suggested, then
arguably the reasonably foreseeable approach should be abandoned altogether.
Therefore, it is rational to advocate that one could reject the hybrid
approach and advocate for the sole use of the “affirmative act” view
based on the Third Circuit’s analysis in Pojilenko. In Pojilenko, the
Third Circuit rejected the reasonable foreseeability approach due to its
view that the language of section 3B1.4 is defendant-specific, and the
enhancement must be based on the individualized determination of the
defendant’s culpability.163 However, the Third Circuit’s argument is unpersuasive for two main reasons. Despite the Third and Seventh Circuits’ claims, both interpretations are plausible and can in fact coexist
because the reasonable foreseeability language as applied to a conspiracy still focuses on the defendant’s culpability. Additionally, the Third
Circuit decided Pojilenko in 2005, and the Seventh Circuit decided
Acosta in 2007. Since then, the other circuits have implemented the
dual approach without being persuaded by these two circuits and without the problems that Pojilenko and Acosta were claiming would occur.
Additionally, if faced with such a situation in other circuits that
currently adhere only to the affirmative act approach, it is hard to predict how they would reconcile the two methods of interpretation. The
Eighth Circuit is the only other court so far to have faced such a case,
and it embraced both methods of application by utilizing the hybrid approach rather than rejecting the reasonable foreseeability approach as
the Third and Seventh Circuits chose to do. Once the other circuits face
a conspiracy case, this adaptation by the Eighth Circuit, and the success
of the hybrid approach in both that circuit and in the Second and Eleventh Circuits, could cause them to be less likely to be persuaded by the
defendant-specific language argument that the Third and Seventh Circuits encourage.
It is important to note that the reasoning employed by the circuits
that rejected the reasonable foreseeability approach describing the defendant-specific language in the introductory commentary to part B of
chapter three in the Sentencing Guidelines was additionally embraced
by the Eleventh Circuit in Taber, but that determination did not lead
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the circuit to abandon the reasonable foreseeability requirement. This
suggests cohesion could exist from a textualist standpoint as well, despite the advocacy of the Third Circuit and previous scholarship that
argues to the contrary.164
C.

Allowing courts to utilize both interpretations in a hybrid approach does not grant too much power to the courts in applying
sentencing enhancements

One might be concerned that the use of both approaches leaves the
courts with an expansive amount of latitude to apply a sentencing enhancement. Perhaps allowing for the courts to apply the affirmative act
approach when the defendant acted alone to involve the minor and allowing the courts to utilize the reasonable foreseeability approach when
a conspiracy exists and the minor was used by the co-defendant grants
too much power to the courts and places the defendant at an unfair disadvantage of having a much higher likelihood of receiving the sentencing enhancement. This is especially true if one views the sentencing
guidelines as a method of restricting judicial discretion. Is there any
situation under the dual approach in which the defendant would not
face a sentencing enhancement if a minor was somehow involved in the
crime? Arguably, yes if the defendant did not reasonably foresee his or
her co-conspirator’s use of a minor. But, if one does not buy that argument, how should we feel about the greater likelihood of receiving a
sentencing enhancement under section 3B1.4? Do the ends of discouraging the involvement of minors in crimes justify the means?
Determining the effect that a two-level sentencing enhancement
would have on defendants varies greatly from case to case. The Sentencing Table used to determine the guideline range charts with the
offense level (1-43) on the vertical axis and the criminal history category
(I-VI) in the horizontal axis.165 The severity of the effect that two levels
can have on a defendant’s sentence depends on the extent of the defendant’s criminal history and what the offense level would have been without the enhancement. With a higher criminal history or a higher initial
offense level, a two-level enhancement pursuant to section 3B1.4 could
increase the defendant’s sentence by many months. However, a defendant with a low criminal history level would likely not face much of a
change in the length of his sentence with a sentencing enhancement of
two levels unless the offense level was 14 or higher prior to the enhancement.
164
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There has been evidence that criminals often age out of participating in criminal activity. If in many of these cases in which the possibility
of applying the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 the defendant
is an older career criminal who demonstrates less of a likelihood of aging out of the criminal activities, perhaps a sentencing enhancement
that increases time would provide a better deterrence. Is the marginal
deterrence important enough to justify this limitation of liberty? If one
is concerned with the defendant’s liberty, then an intent-based standard like the “affirmative act” requirement would be the favored approach. However, it is quite clear that the defendants who are utilizing
minors in their crimes are doing so in an attempt to lower their own
culpability, so perhaps the increased possibility of the sentencing enhancement being applied is a good thing in order to decrease the use of
the minors, which is what was intended by the implementation of the
sentencing enhancement in the first place. We might also think about
conspiracy cases, often involving more experienced criminals, a bit differently. Furthermore, rejecting the reasonable foreseeability approach
would imply that the defendant, if he or she had known, would not have
allowed a minor to be used to commit the crime, which is highly unlikely.
Additionally, there are safeguards in place within the circuits’ holdings that limit this overreach of power. The hybrid approach does not
require the sentencing enhancement to be applied in all circumstances.
For example, the sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 is not applied every single time a co-conspirator utilizes a minor in the crime.
There are situations in which the co-conspirator may have used a minor
in the offense, but it is not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant for
the co-conspirator to have done so. Under such circumstances, the defendant would not receive the sentencing enhancement.
D. The Sentencing Commission could clarify the desired approach
with an edit to the introductory commentary of chapter 3
Alternatively, if one does not want to wait for the circuits to face a
conspiracy case and begin applying the dual approach, the Sentencing
Commission could potentially resolve this issue with an amendment to
the introductory commentary to Chapter Three, Part B of 18 U.S.C. Explicit guidance from the Sentencing Commission, rather than a continuing effort by the courts to determine what the Commission meant by
the language of section 3B1.4, would be beneficial in resolving this issue. Although an amendment to section 3B1.4 itself would of course be
helpful, this would be an effective alternative. The introductory commentary currently reads:
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This Part provides adjustments to the offense level based upon
the role the defendant played in committing the offense. The determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is to be made on
the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct), i.e., all conduct included under § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4), and
not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of
conviction.
When an offense is committed by more than one participant,
§ 3B1.1 or § 3B1.2 (or neither) may apply. Section 3B1.3 may apply to offenses committed by any number of participants.166
While the introductory commentary expressly mentions sections 3B1.1,
3B1.2, and 3B1.3, guidance to section 3B1.4 is noticeably missing and a
direction that clarifies that the language of section 3B1.4 does not qualify as being “otherwise specified” could easily be added should the Sentencing Commission want to clarify its desire regarding interpretation
of the section. Since this ostensibly minor change seems less likely to
happen, it is even more imperative that the circuits take it upon themselves to implement the hybrid approach once they are faced with a fact
pattern that allows them to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
As it currently stands, the circuits are not implementing the twolevel sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4 in a consistent and cohesive manner. However, changes within the circuits since the initial
interpretations of section 3B1.4 indicate that this is less of a circuit split
than it has been previously characterized by some of the circuits and by
the previous scholarship on the application of section 3B1.4. Rather,
there are two existing approaches to determining whether or not to apply the two-level sentencing enhancement of section 3B1.4. The question therefore becomes whether there is a reason to sustain the two approaches in a hybrid manner or whether the circuits should abandon
one approach in favor of the other. Since the circuits who have applied
both approaches under differing circumstances have demonstrated the
ability for the two approaches to successfully coexist as law, future circuits should follow a similar hybrid approach when faced with the
proper conspiracy fact pattern.
Therefore, it is still beneficial for the circuits who consider conspiracy cases and currently only utilize the affirmative act approach to
broaden their approach to include defendants who could have reasonably foreseen the use of the minor by the co-conspirator. Most circuits
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that have yet to adopt the reasonable foreseeability approach in addition to the affirmative act approach have not yet been presented with a
situation in which they are able to consider the question of whether to
apply the enhancement based on the reasonably foreseeable use of a
minor by a co-conspirator and adopt the dual approach. Three circuits
have embraced this dual approach to interpreting the application of section 3B1.4 based on the facts of each individual case at hand, and it has
already proven sustainable in the continued hybrid use of the approaches in cases for many years since. Continuing to apply the sentencing enhancement in this hybrid way will ensure cohesiveness
among the circuits and stay true to the language of the Sentencing
Guidelines under section 3B1.4 and, in conspiracy cases involving a coconspirator’s use of a minor, section 1B1.3(a).

